Dynamical regularities of US equities opening and closing auctions by Challet, Damien & Gourianov, Nikita
October 8, 2018 0:56 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE auctions
Dynamical regularities of US equities opening and closing auctions
Damien Challet
Mathe´matiques et Informatique pour la Complexite´ et les Syste`mes, CentraleSupe´lec, Universite´
Paris Saclay, 3 rue Joliot-Curie, 91192 Gif-sur-Yvette, France
Encelade Capital SA, Innovation Park Building C, EPFL, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
Nikita Gourianov
Physics Department, Oxford University, Clarendon Laboratory, Parks Road, Oxford, OX1 3PU,
United Kingdom
We first investigate the evolution of opening and closing auctions volumes of US equities
along the years. We then report dynamical properties of pre-auction periods: the indica-
tive match price is strongly mean-reverting because the imbalance is; the final auction
price reacts to a single auction order placement or cancellation in markedly different
ways in the opening and closing auctions when computed conditionally on imbalance
improving or worsening events; the indicative price reverts towards the mid price of the
regular limit order book but is not especially bound to the spread.
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1. Introduction
Many equity exchanges use auctions to define meaningful opening and closing prices
associated with substantial liquidity and to decrease price volatility near opening
and closing times. Despite their practical importance and the fact that the relative
volume traded at the opening and closing has been steadily growing, as show be-
low, these auctions have not attracted much work recently, as the attention of the
community has focused on price discovery issues and intraday dynamics. A central
question in the literature is for example the usefulness of auctions. One criterion
is that of market quality, defined for example as the volatility of the price and
bid-ask spreads just after the opening auction or just before the closing auction.
Generally, auctions improve market quality (see e.g. Pagano and Schwartz (2003),
Chelley-Steeley (2008), Pagano et al. (2013)).
Our focus is rather on the auctions themselves and particularly on the pre-
auction periods. Papers closely related to ours are only a handful. Gu et al. (2008)
find a power-law tailed density of the position order placement on both sides of
reference prices in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; Kissell and Lie (2011) report
the average fraction of the auction volumes with respect to the total daily volume
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and their dependence on special days (month end, quarter end, etc.) and on the
capitalization of the assets of US equities. Gu et al. (2010) report that the average
density of the auction limit order book on both sides of the final auction price is
well fitted by an exponential distribution and compute the persistence fluctuation
properties of the order size in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. More recently, and
more in line with our paper, Boussetta et al. (2016) study the French Stock exchange
and find that different kind of market participants enter the pre-auction periods at
markedly different times, the slow brokers acting first, while high-frequency traders
tend to be active nearer the end of auctions. In the same vein, Bellia et al. (2016)
show how and when low-latency traders (identified as high frequency traders) add
or remove liquidity in the pre-opening auction of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Lehalle
and Laruelle (2018) devote part of a chapter to auctions in a spirit close to ours, in
particular regarding typical daily activity patterns. Finally, Challet (2019) shows
that in Paris Stock Exchange, the antagonistic effects of accelerating event rate near
the auction time and the decrease of the typical indicative price volatility cannot
fully explain the observed diffusion properties of the indicative price, which is likely
due to strategic behavior.
This paper is organized as follows: we first determine the distribution of the
volumes of matched orders at both auction ending times. We then find rules of
thumb to estimate opening and closing volumes from daily data. Finally, we examine
the dynamics of the indicative price, imbalance, and matched volume. We show in
particular that the reaction of the final auction price to the placement or cancellation
of an order is markedly different in the opening and closing auctions, and that the
indicative auction prices are mostly under-diffusive, especially during the pre-closing
auction period. Finally, we relate the dynamics of the indicative price to that of the
limit order book: although the mid price does attract the indicative price, the latter
fluctuates rather much and is not specially bound to be in the spread, which, we
argue, is due to the sparseness of the auction order book.
2. Data
Each exchange follows its own auction rules and pre-auction information dissemi-
nation procedure. The basic principle of all auctions however is the same: traders
may submit market orders for the auction (buy/sell a given volume at any price), or
limit orders (buy/sell a given quantity at a given price) which may be valid either
for the auction only or stay in the open-market order book after the auction if they
are not matched. Finally, the matching price is fixed so as to maximize the matched
volume; if such price is not unique, the one closest to the previous close price is
selected.
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What kind of orders and when they may be sent, however, significantly differs
between NYSE Arcaa (henceforth shortened to ARCA), NYSEb and NASDAQc.
For example, during the closing auction on ARCA, limit and market auction or-
ders (known as LOC and MOC, respectively) may be sent until one minute before
the auction time, then during the last minute, only orders reducing the imbalance
are accepted. For NASDAQ, the cut-off time for LOC/MOC orders has been re-
duced to 5 minutes in October 2017. Cut-off time is 10 minutes before the closing
auction for NYSE, which adds discretionary quotes (D-quotes) that may override
imbalance-reducing orders; they are added five minutes before the auction time,
may be submitted or modified up to 10 seconds before auction time, and be can-
celled at any time. While these differences have no direct influence on the measure
of matched volumes, they are likely to change the dynamic properties near the auc-
tion times. Because only ARCA continuously disseminates information, we cannot
document these differences.
We use three data from three different sources:
(1) Individual matched order sizes. For assets traded on ARCA, our Thomson-
Reuters Tick History data set includes an order-by-order breakdown of auction
volumes from 2009-02-10 to 2014-07-01. To fix notations, vxα,k,d is the volume
(in shares) of the k-th matched order for asset α on day d for auction x ∈
{open,close}. This dataset contains 16,165,407 orders.
(2) Daily matched volume for each auction, for the three exchanges, gathered from
the proper flag of Thomson-Reuters tick-by-tick trades data. We denote by V xα,d
the total matched volume of auction x of security α on day d. By definition,
V xα,d =
∑Nxα(d)
k=1 v
x
α,k,d where N
x
α(d) is the number of matched orders at the x
auction of asset α on day d. We shall also denote the auction price by pxα,d This
data set encompasses 4712 US assets from 2010-01-01 to 2016-11-30, which
amounts to 3,125,786 open and close auctions (each), among which 179,669
(6%) for ARCA, 446,396 (14%) for NASDAQ and 2,499,721 for NYSE (80%).
(3) Finally, we gathered the real-time information disseminated by the three ex-
changes from 2016-09-28 to 2018-01-12 for 1076 assets. This information con-
sists in the indicative price pixα,d(t), the current matched volume at that price
W xα,d(t), and the current imbalance I
x
α,d(t), defined as the sum of the market
order imbalance and of the limit order imbalance at the indicative price. While
NYSE and NASDAQ only publish a few snapshots of these quantities per auc-
tion, ARCA disseminates up to a few thousand updates for each auction on each
day. The ARCA dataset contains 47,246,490 updates for 58 tickers. Our data
ahttps://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse-arca/NYSE_Arca_Auctions_Brochure.
pdf, accessed 2018-09-21
bhttps://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/NYSE_Opening_and_Closing_
Auctions_Fact_Sheet.pdf., accessed 2018-09-21.
chttps://www.nasdaqtrader.com/content/TechnicalSupport/UserGuides/TradingProducts/
crosses/openclosequickguide.pdf, accessed 2018-09-21.
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Fig. 1. Reciprocal empirical distribution function of the value of all the trades of open auctions,
close auctions and intraday trading of two of the most liquid assets traded at ARCA during 2012.
provider has a limit of about 4 updates per second; while this is sufficient in
most cases, it becomes insufficient near the auctions times of very liquid assets
such as SPY.
3. Matched volumes
We first focus on fairly stylized properties of auctions volumes and then turn to a
more refined analysis of the pre-auction dynamics: indicative price, volume, activity
rate and relationship with the regular limit order book.
3.1. Single order properties
Figure 1 shows the reciprocal empirical distribution functions of the transaction
values of matched orders defined as pxα,dV
x
α,d at both auctions, together with that
of the open-market transaction values, for SPY and GLD, two of the most liquid
assets traded on ARCA for the whole 2012 year. The distributions of the opening
and closing auctions are clearly much more affected by truncations than that of the
open-market transactions, and the opening auction more than the closing auction.
They reflect, to some extent, the fact that the typical total volume is larger at the
closing auction than at the opening auction.
This raises the question of the nature of the matched orders distribution of a
single day: does the heavy-tailed nature of P (pxα,dV
x
α,d) come from daily fluctuations
or from the distribution of single order value distributions themselves? Whether the
latter have heavy tails may be assessed by fitting it with an exponential and a log-
normal distributions and using the Vuong closeness test (Vuong 1989). We perform
it for each day and each auction with more than 100 matched orders, which amount
to 29168 auctions. There is overwhelming evidence of the presence of heavy tails,
corresponding by convention here to small p-values: about 92.8% of the auction
distributions have a p-value smaller than 0.01, while only 0.1% have a p-value larger
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Fig. 2. Tails of the individual matched order volume distribution, for each day, each asset assessed
by the p-values of the Vuong test of a power-law against log-normal, exponential and truncated
power-law.
than 0.99. Next, we check what distribution may best describe the tails. We use the
method of Clauset et al. (2009), Alstott et al. (2014) to determine the best starting
point of a power-law tail and then investigate how a fit of that tail with a power-
law compares with log-normal, exponential, and truncated power-law distributions.
Figure 2 plots the density of p-values of a Vuong test between a power-law and
the other candidates, computed for each day, each stock and each auction with
more than 100 matched orders. Expectedly, it confirms the heavy-tailed nature of
the tails. Finally, it shows no real difference between a power-law and a log-normal
distribution, while a truncated power-law does not bring a substantial improvement
on average.
3.2. Opening, closing and daily volumes
The total daily volume for a given asset is freely available in contrast to auction
volumes. Thus, we endeavor here to find a rule of thumb to infer the opening and
closing auction volumes from daily data only. Let us focus on the ratios of auction
volumes to total daily volume, denoted by
ρxα,d =
V xα,d
V totalα,d
,
where V totalα,d is the total volume exchanged during day d, including both auctions,
OTC transactions, and outside regular trading hours transactions. We start with
averages over the period 2010-01-01 to the end of the dataset. Figure 3 plots the
densities of log10(ρ) for the three exchanges, each day and each asset. The largest
difference between the open and close is observed in the NYSE exchange, possibly
because it is not fully automated. For example, the opening auction ending time is
not fixed and may happen a few minutes after the opening of the exchange itself.
Remarkably, the close of the NYSE has by far the largest percentage of volume
with respect to the other exchanges. NASDAQ has the least variability between
assets and auctions. We also plot in the same figure the densities of the median
logarithmic ratio asset by asset in order to assess the intrinsic diversity of these
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Fig. 3. Upper plots: density of the logarithmic ratio of the auction volumes to the total daily
exchange volume ρxα,d =
V xα,d
V total
α,d
for each day and each asset, split by exchange. Lower plotw:
density of the asset median logarithmic ratio, split by exchange.
log10 ρα,d ARCA NASDAQ NYSE
open −1.72± 1.24 −1.51± 0.79 −1.61± 0.90
close −1.78± 1.47 −1.15± 0.82 −0.91± 0.60
10mean(log10 ρ) ARCA NASDAQ NYSE
open 0.019 0.031 0.024
close 0.017 0.071 0.12
Table 1. Left table: mean and two standard deviations of the volume ratio per auction log10 ρα,d,
split by exchange. Right table, typical volume fraction 10mean log10 ρα
ratios between the assets.d Once again the variability of the volume ratio between
asset of ARCA is the largest one. The least asset variability for the opening auction
is found in NASDAQ, while NYSE takes the crown for the closing auction volume
fraction, closely followed by NASDAQ. This yields simple rules of thumb for all the
assets: between 2010 and 2016, 12% of daily volume is exchanged at the close of
NYSE, 3% the opening of NASDAQ and 7% at the close of NASDAQ. The densities
of ARCA volume ratios are too wide to be summarized by simple rules of thumb.
This, however, is a static picture determined over more than 7 years. The fraction
dWe use the median in order to avoid accounting for specials days. See Kissell and Lie (2011) for
estimates of the typical change associated to such days.
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Fig. 4. Monthly median of the volume exchanged at an auction divided by the total daily volume;
months with less than 100 assets have been filtered out; left plot: open auction, right plot: close
auction.
of volume exchanged at auctions is not roughly constant. Figure 4 plots the monthly
median fraction of the auction volume divided by the total daily volume as a function
of time (months with less than 100 assets have been filtered out which essentially
removes the beginning of the time-series for ARCA and NASDAQ. It turns out that
the median closing auction fraction has been steadily increasing for all exchanges,
except for NYSE for which this quantity has plateaued in 2015, while the opening
auction fraction has been decreasing since 2012, on average. One should note once
again that the median is taken over all assets of a given exchange, and thus this
plot does not apply to a given asset in particular, as the difference between assets
may be quite large. In other words, inference should be performed asset by asset,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Pre-auction dynamics
Exchanges disseminate pre-auction information about indicative price, current im-
balance at that price and matched volume at that price. The frequency of update
is quite variable: ARCA gives away the most frequent information, NYSE gives up-
dates with increasing frequency as the auction nears, while NASDAQ publishes the
smallest amount of information (only one update before the open). We thus shall
focus on assets traded on ARCA and briefly on those traded on NYSE. We remind
the notations: the imbalance of asset α at auction x on day d at time t is denoted
by Ixα,d(t), the currently matched volume by W
x
α,d(t), and the indicative price by
pixα,d(t).
4.1. Typical activity
Let us first investigate the typical update patterns. For each asset and day, we
measure at fixed time resolution (1 minute) the ratio between the number of updates
up to time t (in minutes) and the total number of updates for that particular day,
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Fig. 5. Average fraction of cumulated number of events as a function of the time for SPY (ARCA),
XOM (NYSE) and TLO (ARCA).
and then compute the average of this quantity over all the days. By definition, this
quantity increases monotonically.
In the NYSE, updates to each quantity are disseminated at fixed times with
a strongly accelerating pattern (convex cumulated number of updates), as can be
seen for XOM in Fig. 5. Update times of ARCA on the other hand are not fixed,
which allows one to quantify asset by asset how the activity unfolds, on average.
Intuitively, one would expect that the activity increases as the time of the auction
nears. This is the case in other kind of auctions with fixed ending times, such as on
eBay (see e.g. Borle et al. (2006)). Indeed, in auctions, sending a non-cancellable
bid reveals some information about one’s intentions. However, the fact that activity
may concentrate just before the time of the auction is not always related to strategic
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behavior. Indeed, human beings tend to prefer to act just before a deadline in less
competitive contexts, such as sending an abstract to a conference, or paying its
fee (Alfi et al. 2007, 2009). Delaying one’s order submission minimizes the risk of
divulging directional information too early. Another possibility to avoid leaking too
much information for the traders is to synchronize their actions at fixed times so
that individual actions are lost in a multitude of orders, as it is the case for example
at 8:30 for SPY (see below), and, to much larger extent in Paris Stock Exchange
(Challet 2019).
Most practitioners however would be more interested in the evolution of the
typical fraction of the indicative matched volume divided by the final auction volume
at a given time. Here, we compute for asset and each day the fraction W xα,d(t)/V
x
α,d
every minute and compute its average and median for each asset. Figure 6 plots this
quantity for SPY and TZA. During the opening auction, one generically notices an
acceleration of the matched volume which is much larger than that of the number of
volume updates, especially after 9:15. This implies that larger orders are submitted
closer to the auction ending time, which is consistent with people trying to avoid
having too much direct impact on the indicative price since the matched volume
increases as a function of time. One also notices that a sizeable fraction of the daily
volume auctions are submitted at or near 8:30 and 8:45 for both assets. Nevertheless,
these two tickers have been chosen to illustrate the lack of universality across assets.
Indeed, TZA clearly shows that during some days, a large fraction of the auction
is cancelled just before the closing auction, but that this is not systematic as the
median fraction does not exceed 1. This also happens for other assets either at
the opening or closing auctions. According Bellia et al. (2016), cancellations near
auction ending time are mostly due to high-frequency traders. The behavior of this
quantity on US exchanges is markedly different from that of Paris Stock Exchange
for which Challet (2019) finds that the number of events increases as a power-law
until the auction time.
While SPY has a clearly accelerating, convex average matched volume ratio
as a function time, we systematically investigated this pattern asset by asset by
fitting polynomials of the first and second degree to W xα,d(t)/V
x
α (d), and computing
their respective Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Using once again the Vuong
ratio test, one finds that a linear fit is favored in 3% for the assets at the opening
auctions, and none at the closing auction at the 5% level; reciprocally, a second
degree fit is better than a linear fit in 64% for both auctions, the remaining 33%
being undecidable. Among these 64% of assets, 75% have a convex, accelerating
behavior at opening auctions, and 89% at closing auctions.
Finally, one may be interested in the typical time at which the average indicative
matched volume reaches a given percentage of the auction volume. For each asset
traded on ARCA, we computed the median time (over the days) of the time at
which 50% of the total auction volume was matched and found two peaks centered
at 8:30 and 8:55 for the opening auction, and a large peak centered at 15:35 for the
closing auctions.
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Fig. 6. Average and median fraction of matched volume and total auction volume as a function of
the time for SPY and TZA, traded on ARCA.
4.2. Mean-reversion and sub-diffusive prices
Focusing on ARCA data, we first check if the indicative price behaves as a
standard Brownian motion, or if the existence of a final auction time and the fact
that the activity and matched volume increases steadily have an influence of the
indicative price fluctuation patterns. More precisely, we measure how the squared
difference between the indicative match log-price log pixα,d(t) and the final auction
log-price log pxα,d(t
x), rescaled by daily variance of the indicative price log returns,
scales with τ = tx − t by defining
D(τ) =
log(pxαd(t
x)/pixα,d(t))
2
var([log(pixα,d(t)/pi
x
α,d(t− 1))])
(4.1)
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Fig. 7. Left and center plots: median square dispersion of the indicative auction price with respect
to the auction price versus the time remaining until the auction, together with a power-law fit
(Hurst exponent H ' 0.45 for the opening auction and H ' 0.23 for the closing auction. Right
plot: histogram of the Hurst exponent H for all tickers of ARCA from fits whose p-values associated
with H are smaller than 0.001.
Generally, D(τ) ∝ τ2H where H is the Hurst exponent. Diffusive processes have
H = 1/2, whereas under-diffusive processes correspond to H < 1/2. Note that we
normalize by the variance of the indicative price log returns of each day, so as to be
able to define D as an average over days in a meaningful way. We first filter out single
auctions with less than 50 price updates. We then discretize τ into slices of 1 minute,
compute the median of D of the days for each slice τ , and perform a non-linear fit
median D(τ) = aτ2H (removing maxτ median D(τ) for the sake of robustness). The
left and middle plots of Fig. 7 show an example of the dependency of D on τ for
the asset with the largest number of updates (SPY); the peak at 08:30 is due to
the fact that many traders submit auction orders around that time, whose effective
imbalance may considerably shift the indicative match price, usually followed by an
opposite jump or gradual relaxation. The right-hand-side plot displays the density
of H over all the assets with enough data on ARCA (we only kept fits whose p-
values associated with H are smaller than 0.001). We find that the indicative price
of the opening auction is sub-diffusive for 73% of the assets for the opening auction
and 93% of the assets for the closing auction.
The sub-diffusive property probably has several causes. First, diffusion is com-
puted backwards from the auction ending time, thus the typical event rate decreases
as the time-to-auction increases, which mechanically leads to sub-diffusion, pro-
vided that the immediate impact per event stays roughly constant. Challet (2019)
discusses this hypothesis in greater details with data from Paris Stock Exchange,
in which the analysis is simplified by simple scaling laws of both the number of
events and the typical indicative price change as a function of time, and concludes
that mechanistic effects alone cannot account for the observed price behavior, which
confirms the importance of strategic behavior. Since no such scaling law holds in
our data, we cannot replicate this result for US equities.
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Indeed, another cause of sub-diffusion comes from the way new orders tend to
cancel the current imbalance on average. In other words, a strategic way of placing
new auction orders consists in waiting until the imbalance sign is the opposite from
that of one’s intentions and only then sending one’s orders. Defining the imbalance
difference of a new event (new order or cancellation) by δIt+1 = It+1−It, this strate-
gic behavior can then be characterized by P [sign (It+1× δIt) = −1]. Note that this
also includes order cancellation, which is much rarer than order placement and will
be thus neglected here. Figure 8 shows the evolution of this conditional probability
as a function of time for VXX, which is representative of many other assets whose
main exchange is ARCA: this probability is smaller for the opening auction than
the closing auction for about 95% of the assets. In addition this probability shows
a clear maximum for the closing auction at around 15:30. Some other assets display
an increase of this probability in the last few minutes before the auctions (SPY, for
one). In passing, note that this probability is about 1/2 for SPY during the opening
auction, and about 0.53 (and roughly constant) during the closing auction, which
is probably due to the fact that our data feed cannot keep up with the event rates
of this asset.
4.3. Response functions
A more refined way to characterize the dynamics of pre-auction periods consists in
measuring how the final auction price reacts to a given type of event as a function
of the time remaining until the auction. For example, is the average response of
the auction price to a new buy order placed at time t positive or negative? In
open-market order books, the answer is intuitive enough. Auctions are different at
least for two reasons. First, as there is no trade before the auction ending time,
real impact is not immediate. Second, sending an order to an auction reveals some
information about one’s intentions, thus there is a clear strategic aspect to the
time of order submission or cancellation. In other words, early orders may trigger a
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different response than later ones simply because the traders who submit the former
have different strategies or expectations than the latter ones and may or may not
cancel some of their orders before the auction ending time, in line with Boussetta
et al. (2016).
Let us first derive the nature of several kinds of events from the sign of the
changes of indicative imbalance and matched volume. Table 2 lists the three kind of
event that may be inferred from out data feed. Note that this kind of determination
becomes imprecise if the fraction of missing updates becomes substantial.
δI δM event
> 0 > 0 new buy order
< 0 > 0 new sell order
any < 0 cancellation or limit order price revision
Table 2. Type of event depending on the change of imbalance, matched volume and match price.
Inspired by Bouchaud et al. (2006), we define the linear response function of the
auction price to a new order, for a given asset α, at given update time ti, as
Rα,+(ti) = median
(
α,d(ti)
[
log pxα,d − log pixα,d(ti)
] |δWα,d(ti+1) > 0, δI(ti+1) 6= 0)i,d ,
(4.2)
where α,d(ti) is the sign (1 for buy and -1 for sell orders) of the i−th order
placed during day d for auction x at time ti = t and asset α, and p
x
α,d is the auction
of price at time tx. The idea is that on average a new buy order pushes the auction
price px in direction opposite to that of a sell order, hence the multiplication of the
price difference by the sign of the new order. The same kind of response function can
be defined for order cancellations, which occur when the matched volume decreases
(δW < 0), which we denote as Rα,-. Figure 9 shows that early new orders have a
definitely positive impact on average, while cancellation has an opposite effect.
It is most revealing to discriminate between events that worsen or improve the
current imbalance. Practically, one computes a response function for each value of
sign I(t) × δI(t + 1). This yields a much richer picture, as show by Fig. 10. For
many assets, there is a clear maximum of the conditional response function of a
new imbalance-worsening order. Once again, cancellations have globally opposite
effect. Most surprising at first is the fact that for many assets, the sign of the
conditional response function reverts between the opening and the closing auctions.
This emphasizes the fundamental difference between the two auctions. While we
cannot provide a definitive explanation for this phenomenon, we believe that it is
mostly due to the fact that active trading takes place during the closing auction,
while much fewer trades take place during the opening auction of US equities.
Finally, note that the response functions of different assets are quite different, which
reflects the fact that the typical population of traders may vary much from asset
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Fig. 9. Median response functions of a new order (left plot) and order cancellation during the
auctions of VXX. Error bars correspond to two standard deviations.
to asset. As a consequence, there is no such thing as the average response function.
This is also the case for the response functions of open market limit order books,
which depends for example on the exponent of the autocorrelation of market order
signs (Bouchaud et al. 2006), which in turn depends on the market participant
population (Toth et al. 2012).
4.4. Indicative price and regular limit order book
Characterizing the dynamics of the indicative price also requires to study its inter-
play with the best prices of the regular market order book. First, some mathematical
notations: a(t) is the best ask price, b(t) the best bid price, m(t) = [a(t) − b(t)]/2
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Fig. 10. Response functions of a new order (left plot) and order cancellation conditional on an
increase (sign ItδIt+1 = 1) or a decrease (sign ItδIt+1 = −1) of the absolute total imbalance
during the pre-open auctions of VXX. Error bars correspond to two standard deviations.
the mid price and mw(t) =
vaa−vbb
va+vb
(t) the mid price weighted by the respective
available volumes (va and vb) at the best prices. Intuitively, the indicative price pi
must be related in some way to the mid price, since both these price are proxies of
the price discovery of the same asset, although in markedly different ways.
We first report the fraction of time (in units of updates) spent by the indicative
price in the spread, i.e., P [b(t) ≤ pi(t) ≤ a(t)] for an update chosen at random in
a given a time slice. Figure 11 reports the average spread (in bps) s˜ = (a − b)/m
versus the average P [b(t) ≤ pi(t) ≤ a(t)] for all assets (average here means average
over the time-slice averages, themselves averaged over days for a given asset). For
open auctions, one finds that s˜ ∝ expP [b(t) ≤ pi(t) ≤ a(t)]. In other words, defining
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spreads δs = |pi − m|/s as a function time for SPY when the indicative price is outside of the
spread; left plot: open auction, right plot: close auction)
the relative deviation of the indicative price by δm = |pi−m|/m and assuming that
the distribution of δm is the same for all these assets and independent from s˜, we
find
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P [b(t) ≤ pi(t) ≤ a(t)] = P (δm ≤ s˜/2) ∝ log s˜,
hence P (δm) ∝ 1/δm: this simple (and rough) argument indicates that the dis-
tribution of relative distance of the indicative price and the mid price, aggregated
over all the assets, is heavy-tailed and that the indicative price cares little about
being in the spread; this is due in part to the fact that the gaps between occupied
ticks in the auction book are very likely heavy tailed, given the fact that regular
trading hours limit order books are sparse provided that the relative tick size is not
too large (Gillemot et al. 2006). We checked that there is no universal P>(δm) for
all the assets, but that it is generally heavy-tailed (see e.g. P>(δm) ' 1/δm for SPY
in Fig. 11). Close auctions take place during regular trading hours, i.e., when the
typical spread is much smaller. If the indicative price has no special reason to be
within the spread, thus is not bound by a strong force to the spread, one expects
that the fraction of time it spends in the spread is smaller than during the open
auction. This is exactly what happens (see Fig. 11). When the indicative price is
outside of the spread, it is typically less than 2 spreads away (Fig. 12), whereas its
average may be much larger at times, especially when the spread is small. Inter-
estingly, the typical mean deviation displays the same behaviour for the open and
close auctions: a steady increase followed by a steeper decrease, with an additional
peak at 8:30, a time at which, as remarked above, a sizeable fraction of volume is
sent for this particular asset (SPY).
A robust way to measure how the indicative price is attracted by the mid price
is the probability that an indicative price change brings it closer to the mid price,
in other words the reversion probability P [(pi(t + 1) − pi(t))(pi(t) − m(t)) < 0].
Figure 13 plots the reversion probability as a function of the spread; the larger the
average spread, the larger the reversion probability when pi is in the spread, for both
auctions. When pi is outside of the spread, the reversion does not depend on the
average spread for close auctions, but clearly does for open auctions. To check how
frequent overshooting is, we also measured P [(pi(t+ 1)−m(t+ 1))(pi(t)−m(t)) <
0|pi not in spread], whose average over the assets is about 0.02 for open auctions,
and 0.05 for close auctions, i.e., quite small.
Finally, we checked if the indicative price was closer to the mid or to the weighted
mid price by estimating the fraction of times |pi(t) −m(t)| > |pi(t) −mw(t)| when
the indicative price is in the spread and outside of it. The difference is small but
real (see Fig. 14). The average P (|pi(t)−m(t)| > |pi(t)−mw(t)|) ' 0.45 over all time
slices and the 35 most liquid assets. In other words, the mid price is a slightly more
trustworthy reference point than the weighted mid price. Whether the indicative
price is in or outside of the spread has no influence on the estimate.
5. Conclusions
The dynamical properties of the auction processes are far from trivial and markedly
different from those of the open-market limit order books. First, because the im-
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balance process is mean-reverting, indicative prices are under-diffusive. Second, the
median response functions at the opening and closing auctions may have oppo-
site signs. Three important ingredients are responsible for these differences. First,
auctions at fixed times force the traders to reveal all liquidity before the auction,
thus increasing the importance of strategic order submission timing, as shown at
times by the large relative cancellation of liquidity just before the auction ending
time, or the acceleration of the fraction of matched volume a few minutes before
the auction ending time for some assets. Second, during the auction process, no
trade originates from the auction book building-up; as a consequence, usual price
efficiency conditions do not apply here. Quite notably in the US exchanges studied
here, continuous double auctions run in parallel to the auction processes; this is
one of the reasons why the opening auction response functions are very different
from those of the closing auctions: indeed, during the closing auction, the relative
liquidity available on the open-market limit order book is much larger than that
of outside regular trading hours during the opening auction. Finally, the indicative
price may be rather far from the mid price of the regular limit order book, although
on average, the former reverts to the latter with non-negligible probability.
Because data availability, our results on pre-auction periods are mostly about
NYSE Arca, i.e., mostly about ETFs. Future work will use better data in order to
check if the above findings also hold for more usual equities. Given the mechanisms
discussed above, this is not unlikely.
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